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Recent Developments:
The Uniform Arbitration Act'
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, a project prepared
annually since 1983, is a survey of recent court decisions that interpret state
versions of the Uniform Arbitration Act ("U.A.A."). 3 Currently, thirty-four states
and the District of Columbia have adopted arbitration statutes patterned after the
U.A.A. 4 The purpose of this project is to promote uniformity in interpretation of
the U.A.A. by explaining the underlying policies and rationales of recent court
decisions.'
II. SECTION 1: VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Section 1 of the U.A.A. provides that:
[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration
or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any
controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable
and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.6
1. This project was prepared by Journal of Dispute Resolution Candidates under the direction
of Associate Editor in Chief John Moore and Note and Comment Editor Laura Kintz.
2. See Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 397; Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1992 J. DISP. REsoL. 411; Recent Developments: The
Uniform Arbitration Act, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 417; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration
Act, 1990 J. DisP. RESOL. 471; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1989 J. DISP.
RESOL. 237; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1988 J. DIsP. REsOL. 247; Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbittation Act, 1987 Mo. J. DIsP. REsOL. 177; Recent Developments:
The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1986 Mo. J. DISP. RESOL. 169; Recent Developments: The Uniform
Arbitration Act, 1985 Mo. J. Disp. RESoL. 173; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act,
1984 Mo. J. Disp. RESOL. 207; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L. REV.
137 (1983).
3. UNIF. ARBITRATON ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.LA. 5 (1985) [hereinafter "UA.A."].
4. Jurisdictions which have adopted arbitration statutes patterned after the UAA. are Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
5. This Article surveys cases decided between September 1992 and September 1993.
6. U.A.A. § 1.
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A. Enforceability
Under Section 1, courts must determine whether "such grounds as exist at law
or in equity" require revocation of an agreement to arbitrate.7 If such grounds do
not exist, the agreement is enforceable and the parties must submit their dispute
to arbitration. Recent arbitration cases include a variety of situations in which
courts have considered the enforceability of arbitration agreements.
In Anderson County v. Architectural Techniques Corp.,' the Tennessee Court
of Appeals held the parties' arbitration agreement to be enforceable.9 The court
stated that if a contract containing an arbitration clause is unenforceable, neither
party may utilize the arbitration clause.'" However, the court disagreed with the
County's contention that failure to list specific projects in the contract rendered
it insufficiently definite to be enforced."
The Texas Court of Appeals also found an enforceable arbitration agreement
in Hearthshire Braeswood Plaza Limited Partnership v. Bill Kelly Co.,'
2
Hearthshire and Kelly entered into a contract that contained an arbitration
provision." Kelly argued the arbitration provision was unenforceable because
Kelly had signed the contract but Hearthshire had not. 4 The court disagreed,
explaining that absent a showing of special circumstances, a party is bound by the
contact he has signed.'"
When considering arbitration agreements in domestic disputes, courts have
often held them to be enforceable. In Bandas v. Bandas,"6 a Virginia court
looked to other jurisdictions for guidance and declared that arbitration agreements
may be used in divorce proceedings." The court stated that such agreements are
binding and should be subject to the same standard of review as any other contract
case.'
8
In Miller v. Miller,9 a mother appealed a Pennsylvania trial court's
determination that an agreement to arbitrate a child custody dispute as part of a
7. Id.
8. No. 03A01-9303-CH-00110, 1993 WL 346473 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
9. Id. at *5.
10. Id at *4.
11. Id.
12. 849 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
13. Id. at 382-83.
14. Id. at 392.
15. Id. The court explained further that a contract does not have to be signed by both parties
to be valid. Id
16. 430 S.E.2d 706 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
17. Id. at 708.
18. Id. Setting forth this standard of review, the court stated that "arbitration agreements should
be upheld unless the agreement is against public policy or unconscionable, which are two grounds to
set aside a contract in equity." Id
19. 620 A. 2d 1161 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
[Vol. 1994, No. 2
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marital settlement agreement was void as against public policy.2 ° The Superior
Court of Pennsylvania disagreed with the trial court and stated that parties should
be able to settle their domestic disputes, including those involving custody,
through arbitration if they choose to do so." However, the Superior Court
emphasized that an arbitration award regarding custody shall not be binding on a
court if the award is challenged as not being in the best interests of the child.22
In Freeman v. Prudential Securities, Inc.,23 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals
held an arbitration provision in an investment contract signed by a conservator to
be unenforceable.24 The appellee in Freeman filed suit alleging that the prior
conservator of her son's estate was persuaded to enter into an investment contract
through material misrepresentations and omissions of fact.23 Prudential answered,
demanding arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision of the investment
contract.26 The Freeman Court held that the conservator was without authority
to enter into the contract, and therefore the arbitration provision was
unenforceable.27
1. Adhesion Contracts
Courts are less likely to enforce an agreement to arbitrate when the agreement
is part of an adhesion contract.28 In Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix,
Ltd.,29 the plaintiff signed a standardized "Agreement to Arbitrate" form prior to
undergoing a clinical abortion.30 The plaintiff suffered a punctured uterus as a
result of the procedure, and subsequently filed a malpractice claim.3' The
defendant motioned to dismiss the claim, asserting that arbitration was required
pursuant to the contract.32 The Arizona Supreme Court found the agreement to
be an adhesion contract, and considered the reasonable expectation of the parties
in determining whether the agreement to arbitrate was binding.3 Because the
20. Id. at 1162.
21. Id. at 1163-64.
22. Id. at 1164.
23. Freeman v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 856 P.2d 592 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
24. Id at 594.
25. Id at 593.
26. Id
27. Id at 594.
28. A contract of adhesion is a standardized form "offered to consumers of goods and services
on essentially a take it or leave it basis without affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to
bargain and under such conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or services
except by acquiescing in the form contract" Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., 840
P. 2d 1013, 1015 (Ariz. 1992) (citing Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 356 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976)).
29. 840 P. 2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992).
30. Id. at 1014.
31. Id at 1015.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1016.
1994]
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clinic did not attempt to explain the contract to the plaintiff, who was under
emotional stress and who had only a high school education and no experience in
commercial matters, the court held that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable.
3 4
The North Carolina Court of Appeals also refused to enforce an arbitration
clause in an adhesion contract in Routh v. Snap-On Tools Corp.35 The court
stated that an agreement to arbitrate should be independently negotiated if it is
included in a contract containing other provisions.36 The requirement of
independent negotiation of an arbitration agreement "militates against its inclusion
in contracts of adhesion."'37 The court based its decision on the finding that
Snap-On never discussed the arbitration provision with Routh and that Routh
believed when he signed the contract he was only agreeing to a repayment
schedule of his debt to Snap-On.3"
2. Right of Access to Courts
Another issue relating to enforceability of an arbitration agreement is whether
the agreement unlawfully restricts the right of access to courts. In Value Car
Sales, Inc. v. Bouton,39 the trial court declared the agreement unlawfully
restrictive and refused to enforce arbitration.4 The Florida Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the parties waived their right of access to the courts by
agreeing to arbitration in lieu of litigation.4 '
In D. Wilson Construction Co., Inc., v. McAllen Independent School
District,42 the Texas Court of Appeals also held that arbitration clauses do not
unlawfully restrict the right of access to courts. 3 The court determined that in
entering into the arbitration agreement, the parties waived their rights of access to
the courts." The court also relied on the strong presumption in favor of
arbitration in reaching its decision.45
B. Scope of the Agreement
In determining whether a particular dispute is within the scope of the
arbitration clause and is therefore subject to arbitration, courts generally favor
34. Id at 1017.
35. 423 S.E. 2d 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
36. Id at 794 (citing Blow v. Shaughnessy, 313 S.E. 2d 868, 876-877 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 795.
39. 608 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. CLt. App. 1992).
40. Id at 861.
41. Id
42. 848 S.W. 2d 226 (rex. Ct. App. 1992).
43. Id at 231.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Tucker, 806 S.W. 2d 914, 919 (rex, Ct. App. 1991)).
[Vol. 1994, No. 2
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arbitration. In United Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. Imo Industries, Inc.,4
the parties entered into a contract that contained a broad arbitration clause.47
United Engineers sought to enjoin the defendants from proceeding to arbitration
on the issue of consequential damages, claiming that consequential damages were
specifically excluded by a limited liability clause in the contract.4" The court
stated that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration .... 49 The court further asserted that the presumption
in favor of arbitration is even stronger in light of the broad arbitration provision
to which the parties agreed."0 Refusing to issue the injunction, the court declared
that the limited liability clause did not restrict the authority of the arbitrators to
decide the dispute."'
C. Modifications of State Statute
Several states have modified Section 1 of the U.A.A., which affects the
validity of some arbitration agreements. Among the modifications are the addition
of a notice requirement and the exclusion of certain types of contracts from
U.A.A. application.
1. Notice Requirements
In Timms v. Greene,52 the plaintiff filed a negligence action seeking
damages for injuries she claimed occurred while she was a resident at the
defendants' nursing home. 3 The defendants motioned to dismiss, claiming
arbitration was required pursuant to the contract plaintiff signed upon becoming
a resident.5 4 The court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement because the
contract did not comply with the notice requirements of the South Carolina
Uniform Arbitration Act." Further, the court rejected the defendant's argument
46. Civ. A. No. 12611, 1993 WL 43016 (Del. Ch. 1993).
47. The clause stated in part, "All claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of,
or relating to, this Contract or the interpretation or breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration..
• "Id. at *2.
48. Id. at *4.
49. Id. at *5 (citing Moses Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983)).
50. Id. at *5.
51. Id. at *7.
52. 427 S.E. 2d 642 (S.C. 1993).
53. Id. at 642.
54. Id.
55. Id at 642-43. The notice requirements of the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration act as
contained in Section 15-48-10 (Supp. 1991) is as follows:
(a)... Notice that a contract is subject to arbitration pursuant to this chapter shall be typed in
underlined capital letters, or rubber stamped prominently, on the first page of the contract and unless
such notice is displayed thereon the contract shall not be subject to arbitration. Id. at 643.
1994]
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that interstate commerce was involved, which might have rendered the agreement
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. 6
In another South Carolina case, Osteen v. T.E. Cuttino Construction Co.,
7
the court again determined that an arbitration agreement did not comply with the
state's notice requirement.58  However, defendant Cuttino asserted that the
Federal Arbitration Act, which does not contain similar notice requirements,
applied, and therefore, enforcement of the agreement was required. 9 The court
explained that the issue of whether state or federal law governs an arbitration
agreement is determined by the intention of the parties.6 °  The court further
stated that if an agreement is ambiguous and is capable of an interpretation that
will make it valid, it will be given that interpretation.6' Examining a choice of
law provision in the contract, the court held that the parties intended for arbitrators
to apply the substantive law of South Carolina to determine the validity and
construction of the contract.6" Therefore, the choice of law provision did not
apply to the arbitration proceedings, and the agreement to arbitrate was
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.63
2. Particular Contracts
Some states have modified their versions of the Uniform Arbitration Act to
render them inapplicable to certain types of contracts. For example, the Oklahoma
Uniform Arbitration Act states that the Act does not apply to "contracts with
reference to insurance except for those contracts between insurance companies."'
In Cannon v. Lane,65 the court held that a contract between the State of
Oklahoma and a health maintenance organization was a contract with reference to
insurance which was expressly excluded from application of the state's U.A.A."
The court then applied common law principles to the agreement, and held it
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
6 7
56. id at 642-43; see also American Physicians Service Group, Inc. v. Port Lavaca Clinic
Associates, 843 S.W. 2d 675 (rex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the arbitration agreement did not
comply with the notice requirements of the Texas General Arbitration Act).
57. 434 S.E. 2d 281 (S.C. 1993).
58. Id. at 282-83.
59. Id at 283. Cuttino asserted that the Federal Arbitration Act ('F.A.A.") should apply since
the contract involved interstate commerce. The court stated that the F.A.A. does not automatically
apply to contracts involving interstate commerce, but rather the intent of the parties to be bound by
state or federal law governs. Id
60. Id
61. Id. at 284.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 802(A) (West 1991).
65. 867 P.2d. 1235 (Okla. 1993).
66. Id at 1237.
67. Id at 1239.
[Vol. 1994, No. 2
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III. SECTION 2: PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION
A. Agreement Between the Parties
Section 2 of the U.A.A. requires a court to compel arbitration on the motion
of one of the parties, unless the other party opposes the motion by denying the
existence of an arbitration agreement.68 Upon this opposition the court must
make a determination of the existence of the agreement.69 The court's decision
should follow a two-step process: (1) the court must determine if there is in fact
an agreement to arbitrate, and (2) the court must determine whether the dispute for
which a party sought to compel arbitration is covered under the arbitration clause
in the contract. 0
In Barter Exchange, Inc. of Chicago v. Barter Exchange, Inc.,71 the First
District Appellate Court of Illinois held that the determination of the existence of
an arbitration agreement must be made solely on the face of the agreement.72 In
interpreting the agreement, the court must not consider any factors extraneous to
the record, such as the performance of the parties subsequent to signing the
contract."
Another Illinois court decided in Cusamano v. Norrell Health Care, Inc.7"
that in order for the court to grant a motion to stay the proceedings, the party
seeking to avoid the arbitration must specifically allege that its assent to the
arbitration agreement was fraudulently induced. 7' For an arbitration clause to be
declared invalid, there must be more than a simple allegation that there was no
contract.76 The court reasoned that such an allegation is too general and feared
that allowing such claims would open the floodgates, allowing parties to avoid
arbitration without just cause.77 The court stated that to hold otherwise "could
effectively end arbitration of contractual disputes in Illinois because almost any
plaintiff can find some theory or claim upon which to allege that no contract
existed, thereby avoiding arbitration."T
An Illinois federal court reached a similar conclusion in Tyco Laboratories,
Inc. v. Dasi Industries, Inc.79 The court concluded that if the dispute is aimed
at the contract as a whole and not the arbitration agreement specifically, the issue
68. U.A.A. §2(a).
69. Id
70. Central Bucks School District v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 629 A.2d 196, 199-
200 (Pa Commw. Ct. 1993).
71. 606 N.E.2d 186 (Ill. App. CL 1992).
72. Id. at 190.
73. id.
74. 607 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
75. Id. at 250-5 1; see U.A.A. §2(e).
76. Id.
77. Id at 251.
78. Id.
79. No. 92C5712, 1993 WL.356929 (N.D. III. 1993).
1994]
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of enforceability is one for the arbitrator rather than the court." As long as the
dispute falls within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate, which is clearly the
case when the arbitration agreement is unlimited as to the contract, the only issue
for the courts to consider is whether the agreement itself existed."1
Although the existence of a valid arbitration agreement is central to the
court's decision of whether to compel arbitration, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held in Langston v. National Media Corp.2 that this determination
is not necessary to all issues of the case.83  For example, even without a
definitive determination of an arbitration agreement, the trial court still has the
authority to grant injunctive relief in an arbitrable dispute."' The arbitration issue
can be temporarily bypassed and the court need only determine whether the
prerequisites for the injunction are themselves justified."5
The enforceability of the arbitration agreement between the parties is
determined in accordance with normal contract principles.8 6 If an agreement to
arbitrate is found to exist, the court must enforce it."' In Christy v. Kelly,8"
Christy opened an investment account and signed an agreement to arbitrate any
dispute concerning the account. 9 When there were significant losses from the
account, the joint owner sued and moved to compel arbitration." Christy alleged
that he had not understood the agreement at the time he signed it.9' The court
held that in the absence of some allegation of fraud or duress, Christy's simple
failure to read or understand the arbitration provision did not justify avoiding its
enforcement.' In doing so, the court stated that judicial economy was not a
legitimate reason for nonenforcement of the arbitration provision.93
In keeping with traditional contract tenets, the court in North American Van
Lines v. Collyer9 4 held that an agreement should be enforced upon finding that
the arbitration clause is valid, the dispute is within the scope of the clause, and the
right to arbitrate was not waived.9" Above all, the parties should be entitled to
the benefit of their valid contractual bargain.96 Although the concept of
80. Id at 7.
81. Id at *6.
82. 617 A.2d 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
83. Id. at 356.
84. Id. at 357.
85. Id.
86. North American Van Lines v. Collyer, 616 So.2d 177, 178-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
87. U.A.A. §2(a).
88. 497 N.W2d 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).





94. 616 So.2d 177 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1993).
95. Id at 178.
96. Id.
[Vol. 1994, No. 2
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arbitration is somewhat new, the court found that traditional common law contract
principles apply and that these principles may not be ignored.97 Therefore, where
the agreement is clear and unambiguous, a court is not justified in refusing to
enforce the arbitration provision solely because of extraneous factors, such as the
financial situation of one of the parties."
The concept of incorporation applies to arbitration agreements as it does in
any other contract situation." In D. Wilson Construction Co.,'0° a separate
document was plainly incorporated into the contract between the parties.'0 ' The
Texas Court of Appeals ruled that one party's failure to read an incorporated
document did not invalidate an arbitration agreement contained therein. 2 The
court noted that a party who signs a contract is charged with notice of its
contents.0 3 As long is there is no fraud, duress or some other traditional
defense to the contract the incorporated provision is enforceable." °
It is fairly well settled that the existence of an arbitration agreement is a
question of law to be decided by the courts."3 Some courts, however, have held
that where there is a question as to the existence of an arbitration agreement, the
question should be left to the arbitrator. In Phoenixville Area School District v.
Phoenixville Area Education Association, °6 the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania determined that the trial court erred in granting a stay of the
proceedings where there was some doubt as to whether the contract could have
been interpreted to cover the dispute.'0 7 In other words, if any uncertainty
exists, the clause should be given to the arbitrator to decide whether the dispute
is grievable.'0 8
Additional persons who were not parties to the original contract containing
the arbitration agreement are often involved in contract disputes. In these
situations, the parties to the contract can still be compelled to arbitrate."°
Although arbitration proceedings cannot be compelled against those who were not
parties to the arbitration agreement, the Illinois Court of Appeals held in Jacob v.
C & M Video, Inc."0 that the disputed claims could be divided to allow partial
97. Id. at 178-79.
98. Id. at 178.
99. D. Wilson Construction Co., Inc. v. McAllen Independent School District, 848 S.W. 2d 226,
229 (Tex. CL App. 1992).
100. 848 S.W.2d at 226.
101. Id at 230.
102. Id.
103. Id (citing Estate of Degley v. Vega, 797 S.W.2d 299, 304 (rex. App. Ct. 1990)).
104. D. Wilson Construction Co., 848 S.W.2d 226, 230.
105. Azcon Construction Co., Inc. v. Golden Hills Resortlnc. 498 N.W.2d 630, 633 (S.D. 1993)
(citing City of Hot Springs v. Gunderson's Inc. 322 N.W.2d 8, 11 (S.D. 1982)).
106. 624 A.2d 1083 (Pa. Conimw. Ct. 1993).
107. Id at 1087.
108. Id.
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arbitration in accordance with the original agreement."' The court based its
decision on the fact that the contract parties had bargained for arbitration, and
therefore, their interests are independent in that respect to the interests of the third
parties." 2  The court noted that agreements in which the dispute clearly falls
within the scope of the agreement are generally enforced despite claims by third
parties."'
Valid arbitration agreements are also enforced in spite of the pendency in
court of an action directly related to the issue sought to be arbitrated. In Boyce
v. St. Paul Property and Liability Insurance Co.," 4 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court fount that the pendency of related actions does not mandate a stay of the
arbitration."' The court decided that related actions before a trial court had no
relevance to the arbitration agreement." 6 Above all, the parties' agreement to
arbitrate is the controlling provision." 7
The Illinois Court of Appeals in Hwang v. Tyler"8 held that the trial
court's determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement becomes final
and binding if the issue is not appealed." 9 Such a ruling is deemed to be
"adverse" to that party and to have it reviewed, an appeal must be made on this
issue. 20 If there is no appeal, then the issue is no longer covered under Section
2.21 To have the arbitrator's award vacated, the parties must follow the
procedures laid out in U.A.A. Section 12.22
B. Waiver
The rights of parties under Section 2 of the U.A.A. can be waived by any or
all of the parties." 3 The question of whether or not a waiver has occurred is for
the court to decide, and the court's jurisdiction in the matter may not be contracted
away by the parties.'24 The commencement of arbitration proceedings does not
waive the right to stay them, as long as there is a showing of no agreement to
111. Id. at 1271.
112. Id. at 1273.
113. Id. at 1274 (citing Atkins v. Rustic Woods Partners, 525 N.E.2d 551, 556 (Ill. App. CL
1988)).
114. 618 A.2d 962 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
115. Id at 967 (citing Sanitary Sewer Authority v. Dial Associates Construction Group, Inc.,
532 A.2d 862, 863 (Pa. Super. Ct 1987) (referring to UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §7304(b) (1955)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 625 N.E.2d 243, 245 (I11. App. Ct. 1993).
119. Id. at 245.
120. Id.; UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §12(a)(5) (1955).
121. Hwang, 625 N.E.2d at 245.
122. Id.
123. U.A.A. § 2.
124. J.F. Hennessy Co., Inc. v. Barlow, No. 9175, 1992 WL 368824 at *2 (Mass. App. Div.
1992) (citing Home Gas Corp. of Mass. v. Walter's of Hadley, Inc., 532 N.E.2d 681 (Mass. 1989)).
[Vol. 1994, No. 2
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arbitrate. 2 In C & M Video," 6 the Illinois Court of Appeals noted that
waiver is generally not favored and only occurs when a party's actions are
inconsistent with the arbitration agreement. 127
In Garrell v. Blanton,128 the South Carolina Court of Appeals found that
participation in arbitration without requesting a stay or objecting to the
proceedings waives the right to contest the validity of the arbitration
agreement.'29 Seeking a stay from the court is the only way to contest the
arbitration proceedings. 3°
The right to compel arbitration can also be waived. The Texas Court of
Appeals in Howell Crude Oil Co. v. Tana Oil & Gas Corp.' held that normal
pretrial preparations, such as discovery and other procedures, do not qualify as
such a waiver.'32 The court noted that strong public policy considerations favor
arbitration.' Despite these considerations, the court recognized that arbitration
is not warranted in every situation.'34 The court reasoned that as long as a party
is open about its intention to seek arbitration proceedings, it should not have to
surrender the rights it would otherwise have under the normal litigation process
in the hope that the court will indeed compel arbitration.' If that was the case,
parties would be dissuaded from moving to compel arbitration for fear that if their
motion were denied they would be unfairly disadvantaged in subsequent litigation
by their lack of preparation.'36
Similar to pretrial preparations, inaction has not been held to constitute a
waiver of arbitration rights. 1 7  The Arizona Court of Appeals in Heinig v.
Hudman38 held that failure to seek a stay of proceedings leading to the first
judgment does not bar the right to compel subsequent arbitration proceedings.'39
The court ruled that if no opportunity has been given to determine unresolved
issues under the initial arbitration, those issues may be pursued later. 40
However, the right to compel arbitration of the unresolved issues must be separate
125. Hilton Head Resort v. Resort Investment Corp., 429 S.E.2d 459, 462 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993).
126. 618 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
127. Id. at 1269 (citing Burnett v. Safeco Insurance Co., 590 N.E.2d 1032, 1041 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992)).
128. 428 S.E.2d 8 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993).
129. Id at 10.
130. U.A.A. § 2.
131. 860 S.W.2d 634 (rex. Ct App. 1993).
132. Id. at 638.
133. Id. at 636 (citing Jack B.-Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268 (rex. Ct. App. 1992));
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Tucker, 806 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex. CL App. 1991)).
134. Id. at 638.
135. Id
136. Id
137. Heinig v. Hudman, 865 P.2d 110 (Ariz. CL App. 1993).
138. 865 P.2d 110 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
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Delays in requesting arbitration are also not an automatic waiver of the right
to enforce the arbitration agreement. 142  In determining whether the right to
compel arbitration has been waived, the court should consider prejudice to the
other party.143 In D. Wilson Construction Co.,'" the parties spent over a year
negotiating their dispute before submitting it to the court.14 s Arbitration was
requested within a month of the commencement of the proceedings. Because no
evidence showed that the delay prejudiced the other party, the court held that
waiver of the right to enforce the agreement did not occur.'
IV. SECTION 3: APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS
Under Section 3 of the U.A.A., selection of the arbitrator(s) to hear the
dispute is usually controlled by the arbitration agreement. 47 Ditto v. RE/MAX
Preferred Properties4" involved a dispute between Ditto and her former
employer, RE/MAX. 4  The arbitration agreement provided that the arbitrators
were to be current RE/MAX employees selected by a RE/MAX manager.' The
trial court struck down the prevision due to the possibility that potential arbitrators
would be biased.'' After the provision was invalidated, the court was not
required to anticipate that the parties' demand a substitute arbitrator by granting
a stay of the proceedings until such a request was made."' The court held that
the trial court could immediately assign another arbitrator and was not required to
wait for the parties themselves to decide on a substitute.'
V. SECTION 5: HEARING REQUIREMENT
U.A.A. Section 5 contains several procedural requirements that must be
followed in arbitration hearings. In Jaycox v. Ekeson 5 4 the Supreme Court of
141. Id.
142. D. Wilson Construction Co., 848 S.W.2d at 230 (citing Transwestem Pepeline Co. v.
Horizon Oil & Gas Co., 809 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)); USC Corp. v. West, 759 S.W.2d
764, 767 (Crex. Ct. App. 1988)).
143. Id.
144. 848 S.W.2d 226.
145. Id. at 230.
146. Id.
147. U.A.A. § 3.
148. 861 P.2d 1000 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
149. Id. at 1001.
150. Id.
151. Id at 1003.
152. Id at 1004.
153. Id
154. 857 P.2d 35 (N.M. 1993).
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New Mexico considered whether or not failure to comply with the procedural
requirements is fatal error that renders the hearing invalid. In the case, Jaycox did
not receive proper notice of the hearing and was unable to attend.' Ekeson
asserted that Jaycox would not have been able to attend the hearing even if proper
notice had been given." 6 Ekeson maintained that absent a showing of prejudice,
the notice error was not harmful, and argued that the award should be valid.'
The court disagreed, and held that the lack of notice was improper per se and that
Jaycox was not required to show actual prejudice." 8 The court stated the
opportunity to testify and offer contrary evidence are matters of right which cannot
be easily discounted." 9
VI. SEcTIONS 9, 12 & 13: CHANGE OF AWARD
Requirements for the modification and vacation of arbitrators' decisions are
specified in U.A.A. Section 12 and Section 13. However some procedural
guidelines for the filing of such motions are set out in U.A.A. Section 9.6
In Humphreys v. Joe Johnston Law Firm, P.C.,'6' the Iowa Supreme Court
held that the procedure for changing an arbitration award can be controlled by the
agreement between the parties. 62 The agreement in Humphreys provided that
the arbitrator had authority to determine the procedural aspects of the case. 63
Within this authority, the arbitrator was found to have broad discretionary power
in decision making.'" The court ruled that with the grant of such power, the
arbitrator was not required to consider an application for modification from one
of the parties.
6
Under Section 9, the parties have 20 days to file with the arbitrator a motion
to change the award.' The court may disregard the time constraint in a case
where proceedings to confirm, modify or vacate an award are pending in the
court. 67 In the case of a pending motion, only the court may make submission
to change the award; the parties themselves may not apply directly to the
155. Id at 36.
156. Id. at 37.
157. Id
158. Id
159. Id. at 38.
160. U.A.A. § 9.
161. 491 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1992).




166. U.A.A. § 9.
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arbitrator.'68 The requirements in Sections 12 and 13 for vacating or modifying
the award still apply to the action however.' 69
In procedural as well as substantive aspects, the agreement between the
parties is of primary concern. Most power is given to the arbitrator to handle the
proceedings, and the court will only interfere where there is no agreement or when
absolutely necessary.'""
VII. SECTION 10: FEES AND EXPENSES OF ARBITRATION
In interpreting Section 10'. ' of the U.A.A., courts have agreed that
arbitrators are prohibited from awarding attorney's fees unless the agreement to
arbitrate specifically says otherwise. 72 In Lee v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham
& Co., Inc.'" the panel of arbitrators entered an award ordering the parties to
"bear their own costs and expenses, including attorney's fees."'174 Smith sought
modification of the award, claiming the arbitrators had no authority to award
attorney's fees. 75 The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
modification, focusing on the state's long-established policy of excluding
resolution of attorney's fees from authority of the arbitrators. 76
A North Carolina Court held not only that arbitrators may not grant
attorney's fees, but further that the court confirming the award may not add
attorney's fees. 177  The decision in Nucor Corp. v. General Bearing Corp.
78
set forth policy considerations for disallowing attorney's fees in arbitration
proceedings. 79 The court explained that the U.A.A. was intended to encourage
efficient and uncomplicated dispute resolution without attorney's fees, which are
the major expense of litigation. 80
168. Id.
169. Id.; see UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §§12, 13 (1955).
170. Central Bucks School District, 629 A.2d at 198-99.
171. U.A.A. Section 10 provides: "Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the
arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in the
conduct or the arb 'tration, shall be paid as provided in the award."
172. See Nucor Corp. v. General Bearing Corp., 423 S.E. 2d 747 (N.C. 1992); Baxter Health
Care Corp. v. Harvard Apparatus, Inc., 617 N.E. 2d 1018 (Mass. Ct. App. 1993).
173. 626 So. 2d 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
174. Id. at 970.
175. Id
176. Id. The court distinguished Pierce v. J.W. Charles-Bush Securities, Inc., 603 So. 2d 625
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). In Pierce, the court upheld an arbitration award of attorney's fees, but only
because the parties stipulated in advance that the issue of attorney's fees would be arbitrable. Pierce,
603 So.2d at 971.
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In Garceau v. Iowa Kemper Insurance Co.,' " the plaintiff demanded
arbitration when a dispute arose concerning the amount of damages he had
suffered." 2 After the panel had awarded damages, the plaintiff sought an order
requiring the defendant to pay his arbitrators' fees and costs amounting to several
thousand dollars.' The defendant argued the insurance policy required the
parties to pay their own expenses.184 The court ordered the defendant to pay the
fees and costs, declaring the provision void as against public policy. 5 The
court explained that requiring the plaintiff to pay his own expenses would penalize
him for choosing arbitration as a method of alternative dispute resolution. 6
VIII. SECTION 11: CONFIRMATION OF AN AWARD
Pursuant to U.A.A. Section 11, courts are required to confirm arbitration
awards upon application of a party unless one of the parties sets forth grounds for
vacating or modifying the award.'87 Courts generally confirm an arbitration
award unless a party demonstrates one of the grounds for modification or vacation
specifically enumerated in Sections 12 and 13 of the U.A.A. For example, in
Fernandez v. Farmers Insurance Company of Arizona, s two automobile
accident victims petitioned for modification or correction of an award. 9  The
petitioners claimed the award was "imperfect as a matter of form" because the
arbitrators used an incorrect method to determine the amount of underinsured
motorist benefits they were entitled to receive."9a ' The court held that its review
of the award was strictly limited, and therefore, confirmed the award.'9' The
court explained that if it modified awards based on honest mistakes of the
arbitrators then "arbitration would be transformed from a final determination of
the controversy into merely the first step in the resolution of a dispute."
92
181. 859 P. 2d 243 (Colo. CL App. 1993).
182. Id. at 244.
183. Id.
184. Id
185. Id at 245.
186. Id.
187. U.A.A. § 11 provides: "Upon application of a party, the Court shall confirm an award,
unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or
correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in Sections 12 and 13."
188. 857 P.2d 22 (N.M. 1993).
189. Id. at 24.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 25-26.
192. Id. at 26. See also, Boyce v. St. Paul Property and Liability Insurance Co., 618 A. 2d 962
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). In Boyce, the insurance company appealed an order confirming an award,
claiming the arbitration award was "contrary to the law." Boyce, 618 A.2d at 968. The court declared
itself bound by the statutory grounds for modification and vacation of awards and affirmed
confirmation of the award. Id.
1994]
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In South Washington Associates v. Flanagan'93 the parties signed a
stipulation for arbitration shortly before trial. 4 The stipulation provided that
any appeal of the arbitration award would be reviewed under the same standards
applied to appeals from the state trial courts. 95 The court concluded that the
parties' attempt to empower the courts to conduct substantive review of the
arbitration was void and unenforceable.' 96 Therefore, the court held that the
U.A.A. requirement of limited review supported confirmation of the award.'
An Illinois court considered whether to confirm an arbitration award in light
of a statutory requirement that it be a written and signed award.'98 In Just Pants
v. Wagner'" the contract expressly provided that any disputes would be resolved
by arbitration in accordance with applicable rules of the American Arbitration
Association ("A.A.A.",).200 The A.A.A. rules required that an award be a
"written, signed award. '0 '1 The court confirmed the award upon its
determination that a letter signed by the arbitrator and attached to the
memorandum of his award fulfilled the statutory requirement. °2
IX. SECTION 12: VACATION OF AWARDS
Traditionally, jurisdictions that have adopted the U.A.A. have conducted very
limited review of arbitration awards. In applying such deferential standards, the
reviewing courts have advanced arbitration as an effective, efficient and
determinative form of alternative dispute resolution. When faced with the decision
of whether to affirm or vacate an arbitration award, reviewing courts find guidance
in Section 12 of the U.A.A. °3
193. 859 P. 2d 217 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
194. Id. at 219.
195. Id at 219. The relevant portion of the stipulation provided:
The Uniform Arbitration Act [§13-22-21, et seq., C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A)] shall
apply for the purpose of the confirmation of the arbitrators' award. The parties further
agree that for the purpose of any appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals or the Colorado
Supreme Court the arbitrators' award shall be reviewed using the same standard as
findings of fact and the conclusions of law by a Colorado District Court.
Id.
196. Id at 221.
197. Id.
198. Just Pants v. Wagner, 617 N. E. 2d 246, 248 (Il1. App. CL 1993).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 247.
201. Id at 248.
202. d at 253.
203. Section 12 provides as follows:
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
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In certain jurisdictions, the legislature has expanded the basic statutory
language of the U.A.A. by placing certain arbitration agreements beyond the scope
of statutory review. For example, the Illinois version of Section 122'4 of the
U.A.A. exempts arbitration of collective bargaining agreements from the statutory
standard of review.20 5 However, in accordance with the generally accepted
principle of granting substantial deference to arbitration awards, Illinois courts
have conceded that when applied to collective bargaining proceedings, the
common law standard of review is more restrictive than that provided by
statute.2 °6
Alternatively, other jurisdictions have expanded the grounds on which a
party may prevail on a motion to vacate an arbitration award. For example,
conduct such as "behavior beyond the bounds of natural justice, excess of
authority, or a manifest mistake of fact or law appearing on the face of the award"
may support the party's motion to vacate. °7 Although the standard and scope
of review differ among the several jurisdictions that have adopted the U.A.A.,
courts reviewing arbitration awards appear very hesitant to interfere with an
arbitrator's decision.
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being
shown therefore or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so
conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice
substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate in the
arbitration without raising the objection; but the fact that the relief was such that it could
not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or
refusing to confirm the award.
(b) An application under this Section shall be made within ninety days after delivery
of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated upon corruption, fraud
or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety days after such grounds are known
or should have been known.
(c) In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in clause (5) of Subsection (a)
the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the
agreement, or in the absence thereof, by the court in accordance with Section 3, or of the
award is vacated on grounds set forth in clauses (3) and (4) of Subsection (a) the court
may order a rehearing before the arbitrators who made the award or their successors
appointed in accordance with Section 3. The time within which the agreement requires
the award to be made is applicable to the rehearing and commences from the date of the
order.
(d) If the application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the award
is pending, the court shall confirm the award.
U.A.A. § 12.
204. 710 I.L.C.S. 5/12(e) (1989).
205. Chicago Transit Authority v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 614 N.E.2d 120, 123-24 (II1.
App. Ct. 1993).
206. Id. at 126. The Illinois Supreme Court has established that the common law standard of
review will protect an arbitration award pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement unless the award
fails to "draw its essence" from the contract Id at 125.
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A. Procurement of Award by Corruption, Fraud
or Other Undue Means
Generally, a reviewing court does not have the power to review an arbitration
award based merely on allegations of arbitrator error as to the facts or law.2 "
The arbitration award will be treated as "a final and conclusive resolution to the
parties' dispute" provided that the award was made honestly, fairly and within the
scope of the submission presented to the arbitrator.0 9 However, under certain
circumstances, such as when the arbitrator's mistake of fact or law is so egregious,
the reviewing court, by implication, may find evidence of fraud, misconduct or
lack of fair and impartial judgement, and therefore, vacate the arbitration
award.210
In Fernandez v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Arizona,2 ' Flora and Ruby
Fernandez ("the Insureds") made claims against the underinsured motorist
provision of their insurance policy provided by Farmers Insurance Company of
Arizona ("Farmers").212 The Insureds were involved in an automobile accident
in which they sustained injuries in excess of the at fault driver's liability
coverage.' After the Insureds and Farmers were unable to agree on the total
amount of the Insureds' damages, arbitration was ordered in accordance with the
terms of the insurance policy.2"' In determining the amounts to be recovered
from Farmers, the arbitration panel limited the award to the amount of the
Insureds' individual damages in excess of the $60,000 limit as provided in the
tortfeasors liability coverage." As a result of this calculation Flora Fernandez
received $15,000, and Ruby Fernandez was not entitled to any underinsured
motorist benefits. 6
The Insureds requested the district court to review the award on the grounds
the arbitration panel misapplied the applicable law when determining the amount
of underinsured benefits to be awarded to the Insureds."' The district court
agreed with the Insureds and remanded the award back to the arbitration panel to
apply the applicable law.2"8 After the district court's order remanding the award,
Farmer's request for an interlocutory appeal was granted by the New Mexico
208. Fernandez v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 857 P.2d 22, 25-26 (N.M. 1993).
209. Id. at 26.
210. Id. at 26.
211. 857 P.2d 22.
212. Id at 23.
213. Id at 23. The single limit policy provided for a maximum of $60,000 of liability coverage.
Of this amount, Ruby Fernandez received $25,000 and Flora Fernandez received $20,000. A passenger
in the Fernandez automobile received the remaining $15,000.
214. Id. at 23. The arbitration panel determined Ruby and Flora Fernandez's damages to be
$32,500 and $75,000 respectively.
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Supreme Court.2 9  Because the calculation of underinsured motorist benefits
involving multiple claimants was in such an uncertain state in New Mexico, the
Supreme Court concluded that, although a mistake of law may have been made,
the mistake did not evidence any conduct that provided a valid grounds for
vacating the arbitration award.2 °
B. Arbitrator Partiality, Misconduct and Bias
Because the arbitrator is free to decide the facts and determine the law during
the arbitration process with substantial insulation from appellate review, the courts
carefully scrutinize any allegation or appearance of impropriety; such scrutiny
helps to assure the impartiality of the arbitration process.2 ' Although the
relationship between the parties and the arbitrator may be subjected to careful
scrutinization, the arbitration award will be vacated only upon a substantial
showing of bias or partiality on the part of the arbitrator.222
In Wyoming Game and Fish Commission v. JR Thornock,223 the court
refused to vacate the arbitration award solely because a member of the arbitration
panel had a brother who was married to a party's sister. 24 Since the record
reflected no other evidence of misconduct, the court concluded that without more
such a remote marriage relationship failed to establish any evidence of partiality
on the part of the arbitration panel.223
In Town of Silver City v. Garcia,26 Garcia, a police officer discharged from
the Silver City Police Department for allegedly having sex with a seventeen-year-
old girl while on duty, elected to have his disciplinary matter resolved through
binding arbitration.227 The arbitration award which included the reinstatement
of Garcia to his rank prior to discharge was attacked by the City's petition to
219. Id at 24-25.
220. Id. at 26. At the time of the arbitration award, the appellate courts of New Mexico had not
addressed the situation where multiple claimants were involved in the calculation of underinsured
benefits.
221. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148-50
(1968); But see Creative Homes and Millwork, Inc. v. Hinlde, 426 S.E.2d 480 (N.C. CL App. 1993)
(determining the "appearance of impropriety" standard as set forth in Commonwealth Coatings too
narrow and recognized that "[o]ther jurisdictions that have considered the issue favor disclosure, but
the majority view appears to be that an award will not be disturbed where the undisclosed relationship
is not substantial." (citing Ruffin Woody and Assoc., Inc. v. Person County, 374 S.E.2d 172 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1988)). Id. at 482-83.
222. Ditto, 861 P.2d at 1003 (stating the proposition that "[t]he law does not require arbitrators
to be completely impartial or disinterested, so long as they are able to adjudicate the parties' dispute
fairly and impartially."). Id.
223. 851 P.2d 1300 (Wyo. 1993).
224. Id. at 1305.
225. Id.
226. 857 P.2d 28 (N.M. 1993).
227. Id at 31.
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vacate."2 The City attempted to establish partiality by arguing that the arbitrator
refused to properly evaluate and consider the corroborative evidence offered at the
hearing.229  In order to meet its burden of proving partiality, the court required
the city to provide supporting evidence that was "direct, definite and capable of
demonstration rather than remote, uncertain, or speculative."'230 Since the City
was unable to meet the required burden, the court held that the district court
correctly decided not to vacate the arbitration award.23' The court concluded
that a finding of partiality could not be inferred from adverse evidentiary rulings
or imputed from the manner in which the arbitrator evaluates evidence; at best, the
City's allegations of partiality were speculative, indefinite and uncertain.
23 2
A presumption of bias may also arise when an arbitrator and a party to the
arbitration are involved in the negotiation of a separate matter.233 In Drinane
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 234 the plaintiffs, Thomas,
Edward and Geraldine Drinane, filed suit in circuit court attempting to have an
arbitration award vacated on the grounds that the arbitrator failed to disclose a pre-
existing relationship with State Farm and its attorneys Querrey and Harrow.2 "'
The arbitrator, an attorney with a private practice, was involved in pending
litigation against an individual whose liability insurer also happened to be State
Farm; the arbitrator failed to disclose the nature of the relationship to the parties
involved.236
In order to overcome the presumption of bias created by this nondisclosure,
State Farm submitted affidavits that detailed the relationships between the parties
involved in the present arbitration and the action involving the arbitrator's
client.237 The court was satisfied that neither the representatives of State Farm
nor its law firm handling the present arbitration dispute participated in any of the
proceedings concerning the arbitrator's pending claim against the insurance
company.238 Thus, no bias on the part of the arbitrator was found.239
228. Id. The district court refused to vacate the award.
229. Id at 34.
230. Id at 34 (citing Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, Grace v. Santa Fe Pac. R.&, 459 U.S. 838 (1982)).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Drinane v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 606 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (Ill.
1993). See also Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Company, 620 N.E.2d 355 (11. 1993) (stating
that either party is not precluded from selecting an arbitrator with whom the party has a business or
financial relationship as long as the efforts in rendering the award comport with UAA. and the
arbitration provisions of the insurance policies). Id at 364.
234. 606 N.E.2d 1181 (Ill. 1993).
235. Id. at 1182-83.
236. Id at 1182. State Farm was also represented by Querrey and Harrow in the arbitration
proceedings currently in question.
237. Id. at 1185.
238. Id
239. Id at 1185-86
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In Graceman v. Goldstein,24 ° the Gracemans entered into a transaction
with Goldstein and seven other investors ("Buyers") to sell their interest in a chain
of womens fashion stores.2 4 ' The clothing stores subsequently went out of
business and a dispute concerning the terms of the transaction arose between the
Gracemans and the Buyers.242 Subsequent to an arbitration proceeding, the
Gracemans appealed a circuit court's decision to vacate an arbitration award in
their favor.243 The award was vacated based on the finding of evident partiality
on behalf of the arbitrator in favor of the Gracemans.2' In support of their
claim of bias, the Buyers alleged conduct both during the arbitration proceedings
and post-award that they believed provided evidence of partiality. 245
The appellate court found that even if the allegations of post-award conduct
were true, such bias would be irrelevant when considering a motion to vacate an
arbitration award. 246  The court explained that the conduct of the arbitrator
should be reviewed based on any alleged partiality during the arbitration
proceedings and not after an award has been rendered.247 In regard to the
alleged conduct that transpired during the arbitration process, the court recognized
the general rule that a party's failure to object to the arbitrator's improper conduct
at the time the party becomes aware of such behavior or before the publication of
the arbitration award will result in a waiver of the party's right to object after the
award has been issued. 48
C. Arbitrator Exceeding the Scope of Authority
In order to successfully challenge an arbitration award on the grounds that
an arbitration panel exceeded its authority, the party attempting to vacate the
award must provide clear, strong, and convincing evidence. 49 In addition, the
party must demonstrate that it has been prejudiced by the arbitrators' conduct. 250
The arbitration panel will be found to have exceeded its power when making an
award beyond the scope of authority granted by the parties or the operative
documents and when deciding issues unrelated to those submitted to
arbitration.251' An arbitration award will not be vacated simply because the court
.240. 613 A.2d 1049 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
241. Id. at 1051.
242. Id at 1051-52.
243. Id. at 1051.
244. Id.
245. Id at 1053.
246. Id. at 1055.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1056.
249. Allied American Ins. Co. v. Culp, 612 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Il. App. Ct. 1993).
250. Id




Chapman et al.: Chapman: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
disagrees with the panel's decision.252 Furthermore, to allow the arbitrator the
ability to exercise substantial latitude in resolving the dispute, some jurisdictions
will vacate an arbitration award only after being convinced the award was
"completely irrational."2 53
In Wyoming Game and Fish Commission v. Thornock,2 54 J.R. Thornock, a
Wyoming property owner, brought a claim pursuant to a wildlife statute seeking
compensation for the cost to construct a fence designed to keep elk out of stored
hay.255 Thornock's claim was rejected because the compensation sought was not
for damages caused by wildlife and was not otherwise covered by the statute.256
The claim was subsequently arbitrated, which resulted in an award to
Thornock. 2" In support of its petition to set aside the award, the Commission
argued that the arbitration panel exceeded its power when it awarded Thornock
expenses for a claim not covered by the statute.25 The Supreme Court of
Wyoming agreed and vacated the arbitration award.259
In Town of Silver City v. Garcia,26 the city argued that by using the wrong
standard of proof when evaluating the evidence presented, the arbitrator exceeded
his authority.261  The court rejected the city's argument by finding that
arbitrators do not exceed their authority when making mistakes of fact or law.262
Instead, the court concluded that arbitrators will exceed their power when they
attempt to resolve issues beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement.263
In Boyce v. St. Paul Property and Liability Insurance Co.,2  Andrea
Boyce was injured when the ambulance in which she was riding was struck by an
uninsured motorist.2 65 After St. Paul refused Boyce's claim under the ambulance
services's uninsured motorist policy, she demanded arbitration as provided by the
terms of the insurance policy.266  The arbitration panel awarded Boyce
252. Office of the State Auditor v. Minnesota Assoc. of Professional Employees, 504 N.W. 2d
751, 754-55 (Minn. 1993) (citing Children's Hosp., Inc. v. Minnesota Nurses Ass'n, 265 N.W.2d 649,
652 (Minn. 1978)).
253. Carlson v. Farmers Ins. Group of Companies-Farmers Ins. Exch. 492 N.W.2d 579, 581
(N.D. 1992). Cf Wichinsky v. Mosa, 847 P.2d 727, 731 (Nev. 1993) (explaining that an arbitration
award will not be enforced if determined to be arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by the agreement).
254. 851 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Wyo. 1993).
255. Id. at 1302.
256. Id.
257. Il at 1303.
258. Id. at 1304.
259. Id. at 1306.
260. 857 P.2d 28 (N.M. 1993).
261. ld at 32.
262. Id
263. Id.
264. 618 A.2d 962 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
265. Id at 964. Boyce was not an employee of the ambulance service; she was a neonatal and
pediatric nurse at a hospital which contracted with the ambulance service to perform transport.
266. Id.
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$1,393,500.267 However, the trial court vacated the award on the grounds that
it exceeded the $1,000,000 policy limit and ordered a rehearing to re-assess the
damages.268 Without conducting a rehearing, the arbitration panel reduced
Boyce's award to the $1,000,000 policy limit.269  St. Paul then filed a petition
to vacate the amended award, arguing that the arbitration panel exceeded its
authority by not conducting the rehearing as ordered by the trial court.
270
The appellate court refused to vacate the award. 7 The court reasoned that
since the trial court vacated the award exclusively because the award exceeded the
policy limits, there was no need to conduct another hearing on the issue of
damages.272 Since both parties had previously been afforded the opportunity to
present all relevant evidence concerning the issue of damages, the court found that
conducting another full-blown hearing was unnecessary.
2
"
D. Refusal to Postpone Hearing or Hear Relevant Evidence
An arbitration award may be set aside when a reviewing court determines the
arbitration proceedings to have been conducted in a prejudicial manner.274 For
example, either party may be prejudiced when the arbitrator refuses to postpone
a hearing upon a showing of sufficient cause, refuses to hear evidence material to
the controversy, or otherwise conducts the hearing so as to substantially prejudice
one of the parties.275  A party attempting to vacate an award by asserting that
the arbitrator refused to hear certain evidence must prove not only that they were
"substantially prejudiced" but also that the disputed evidence was "material" to the
resolution of the issues in dispute.27
In Humphreys v. Joe Johnston Law Firm,277 the parties were entangled in
a dispute arising from the attempted transfer of the Humphreys' law practice to
the Johnston law firm.278 The parties agreed to submit the controversy to
arbitration.279 Unsatisfied with the arbitration award, Humphreys filed a petition
267. Id. at 965.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 965-66.
270. Id




275. Id. See also Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Deitrich, 803 F.Supp. 1032, 1040 (M.D.Pa.
1992) (stating that pending third party actions arising out of underinsured motorists claims do not
constitute "good cause").
276. Canteen Corp. v. Former Foods, Inc., 606 N.E.2d 174, 180-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). See
also Silver City v. Garcia, 857 P.2d 28, 33 (N.M. 1993) (defining "material" evidence as evidence that
relates to the matter in dispute or that has a reasonable relation to the issue to be decided).
277. 491 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1992).
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to vacate in district court which was subsequently denied. Humphreys then
appealed to the Supreme Court.28
Humphreys' petition to vacate was supported by claims that he was
prejudiced by the arbitrator's failure to consider certain items of evidence.2 '
Since some of the exhibits entered as evidence were missing after the arbitration
proceedings had concluded, Humphreys contended that the arbitrator failed to
consider the exhibits when determining the award. 2 The Court maintained that
absent any evidence to the contrary, the arbitrator is presumed to have considered
the evidence.283 Even if Humphreys' allegations were true, the claim would still
have failed because an arbitrator's failure to consider certain evidence is not in
itself sufficient to vacate an arbitration award.284
If an arbitrator's refusal to postpone the proceedings upon a sufficient
showing of good cause is shown to be an abuse of discretion, the arbitration award
may be vacated.28 5 An abuse of discretion may be found when the arbitrator's
decision is contrary to logic or reason.28 6 In Jaycox v. Ekeson,2 8 7 the parties
agreed to have their civil dispute submitted to binding arbitration.2 8 Two
arbitration hearings were conducted at which both parties and two other witnesses
testified. 89 Because he was out of the state on a military assignment and did
not receive timely notice, Jaycox was unable to attend the third and final hearing,
and his attorney made an oral motion to continue the hearing.2
The arbitrator denied the motion to continue, and the hearing, conducted in
the absence of Jaycox, resulted in an unfavorable award.29' Jaycox then filed
an application to vacate the award on the grounds that he was prejudiced by both
the lack of timely notice and the arbitrator's refusal to continue the hearing.292
In finding that Jaycox's prior military commitment was sufficient cause to support
his motion for a continuance, the court concluded that the arbitrators refusal to
continue the hearing was contrary to logic and reason.293 Although Jaycox had
been afforded the opportunity to testify and cross examine Ekeson at the prior
hearings, the court, in vacating the award, found that Jaycox had been sufficiently
280. Id.




285. Jaycox v. Ekeson, 857 P.2d 35, 38 (N.M. 1993).
286. Id.
287. 857 P.2d 35.





293. Id. at 38.
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prejudiced by both the lack of timely notice and his inability to attend the hearing,
to testify and to offer evidence.
294
E. Public Policy
Occasionally, the courts are asked to go beyond the provisions of the U.A.A.
and vacate an arbitration award that violates some "well-defined" and "dominant"
public policy of a given jurisdiction.293 In State Auditor v. Minnesota Ass 'n of
Professional Employees,296 an employee from the state auditor's office was
discharged for falsifying expense reports and engaging in other activities that
compromised the integrity and credibility of the auditor's office.297 The
Minnesota Association of Public Employees challenged the discharge.2 98  The
arbitration resulted in a finding that the Auditor's Office lacked "just cause" to
discharge the employee.299 The district court vacated the arbitration award
because the award violated "an explicit, well-defined, and dominant" public policy
favoring the honesty and integrity of individuals responsible for ensuring public
funds are properly expended.300 Upon review, the court of appeals reversed the
district court, and a subsequent appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court
resulted.30'
The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the employee's conduct may
have violated the "well-defined" and "dominant" public policy advanced by the
district court, but that the district court's focus was misplaced.0 2 In vacating
an arbitration award because it violates public policy, the court must direct its
attention to whether the award, if enforced, would violate the "well defined" and
"dominant" public policy, and must not focus on the conduct of the employee.
30 3
The Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that the arbitration award reinstating




295. State Auditor v. Minnesota Ass'n. of Professional Employees, 504 N.W.2d 751, 752 (Minn.
1993).
296. 504 N.W.2d 751.
297. Id. at 753.
298. Id.
299. Id
300. Id. at 754.
301. Id at 754-55. The appellate court noted the deferential standard of review when it
determined that pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement the arbitrator had the
authority to determine the issue of "just cause". Id.
302. Id. at 757.
303. Id.
304. Id at 758.
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F. Timing
A party's application to vacate an arbitration award must be filed within
ninety days after the delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant." 5 The
ninety day period will not be extended when an opposing party files a petition to
confirmn the award.') Therefore, when a response to a petition to confirm the
award contains allegations supporting vacatur, the party must file the response
within the ninety day period in order to be timely." 7 However, when a party
files an application to modify the arbitration award pursuant to Section 9 of the
U.A.A., the ninety day period provided in Section 12 will be tolled until the
Section 9 petition is resolved.08 Thereafter, the party attempting to vacate the
award has ninety days from the time of delivery of the court's decision to file the
petition to vacate, regardless of outcome of the petition to modify.3
X. SECTION 13: MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF AWARD
As one can see from U.A.A. Sections 11 and 12, judicial review of
arbitration awards is extremely limited under the U.A.A. The Supreme Court of
Iowa recently said, "To allow a court to 'second guess' an arbitrator by granting
a broad scope of review would nullify those advantages [inherent in
arbitration].,31o
To apply to the court for modification or correction of an award, a party
must allege one of the statutory grounds found in Section 13. The court can only
change the award if: (1) there is an evident miscalculation or error in description;
(2) the arbitrator considered a claim she was not supposed to consider; or (3) the
award is not in the correct form.3  If the court does not find one of these
errors, it has no choice but to confirm the award. 32
Nucor Corp. v. General Bearing Corp.3t3 involved a stock purchase
agreement. The agreement provided for arbitration and for expenses to be divided
equally between the parties.3 4 An arbitration panel awarded Nucor over $1.5
million for General Bearing's breach of the stock purchase agreement.15
However, the arbitration panel did not award attorney's fees.3 6 The panel stated
305. U.A.A. § 12(b).
306. Hough v. Howington, 627 N.E.2d 36, 39 (II1. App. Ct. 1993).
307. Id
308. Id at 3940.
309. Id at 40.
310. Humphreys, 491 N.W.2d at 515 (quoting Sergeant Bluff-Laton Educ. Ass'n v. Sergeant
Bluff-Laton Community School Dist., 282 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 1978)).
311. U.A.A. § 13(a).
312. U.A.A. § 13(b).
313. 423 S.E.2d 747 (N.C. 1992).
314. Id. at 748.
315. Id. at 749.
316. Id.
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that it believed it lacked the authority to do so because the agreement did not
provide for attorney's fees, and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1.567.11 (1993) (U.A.A. § 10)
specifically excludes the awarding of attorney's fees unless the arbitration
agreement allows otherwise.
31 7
Nucor filed a motion with the superior court requesting confirmation of the
arbitration panel's award and asking the court to award attorney's fees.31 ' The
superior court granted both requests. 9 General Bearing appealed the superior
court's award of attorney's fees, but the North Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed.320 General Bearing appealed again and the Supreme Court of North
Carolina reversed, holding that the trial court lacked the power to change the
arbitrator's award by adding attorney's fees.32" ' The court stated that N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1.567.14 (1993) (U.A.A. § 13) provides the exclusive grounds for
changing an arbitration award, and none of the grounds are applicable to adding
attorney's fees.32 2
In contrast, in Mossman v. CNC Ins. Assoc., Inc.,323 the Delaware Court of
Chancery found that in an action to confirm an arbitration award, the court could
hear an additional claim that did not arise until after the arbitration award came
into being.324  The court felt that the statutory claim did not change the
arbitration award.3 25 Therefore, the claim could be heard despite the limitations
on changing an award in Delaware's Arbitration Act.326
A. Section 13(a)(1): Evident Miscalculations
In Applewhite v. Sheen Fin. Resources, Inc. ,32' the arbitrators awarded
$37,053.02 to Sheen because Applewhite breached a non-competition clause in
their employment contract.32 The arbitrators designated as costs $8,018.51 of
the amount awarded.329  The circuit court confirmed Sheen's award.330  On
appeal, Applewhite argued that the arbitrator miscalculated the award because over
317. Id
318. Id
319. Id. The court awarded the attorney's fees pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.2(2) (1993).
This statute mandates the awarding of attorney's fees when certain contractual arrangements are
breached.
320. Id.
321. Id at 751.
322. Id
323. No. 1202-K, 1993 WL 330062 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 1993).
324. Id. at * 1-2. The additional claim came under the Wage Payment and Collection Act which
mandates statutory damages and attorney's fees to be awarded once wages are found to be due. DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1103(b) and 1113(c) (1985).
325. Id.
326. Id.; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 5715 (1975); U.AA. § 13.
327. 608 So.2d 80 (Fla. Dist CL App. 1992).
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$4,000 of arbitration costs had already been paid.33" ' The Florida District Court
of Appeal found that such a miscalculation was not evident from the award.332
There was nothing in the award to indicate that the $8,018.51 in costs included
any amount for arbitration costs. 3 3 Therefore, the circuit court had correctly
confirmed the award under FLA. STAT. ch. 682.14 (1990) (U.A.A. § 13).334
As can be seen by Applewhite, Section 13(a)(1) has been interpreted very
narrowly. To warrant judicial correction, the error must be completely obvious
from the award itself.333  Most, but not all, are probably mathematical or
336typographical errors.
An example of what is not considered an evident miscalculation is found in
Renaissance Enter., Inc. v. Ocean Resorts, Inc. 3"' Renaissance, a travel agency,
brought two claims against the resort for breach of a contract: (1) approximately
$100,000 for nonpayment of commissions; and (2) $748,682 for nonpayment of
military referral fees.338 The arbitration award said, "Renaissance is entitled to
the sum of $51,770.40 plus interest in the amount of $17,796.33. ... This award
is in full settlement of all claims and counterclaims submitted to this
arbitration." '339 On appeal, Renaissance argued that the award included interest
on the entire $51,770.40, and that according to the contract, Renaissance was not
entitled to receive interest on military referral fees.34° Therefore, Renaissance
argued, the $51,770.40 award did not include any amount for military referral
fees.34' Consequently, the award should have been modified by the circuit court
to include an amount for military referral fees.342 The South Carolina Court of
Appeals rejected the argument, stating that the award did not qualify for judicial
review under S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (U.A.A.
§ 12(a)).343 Even if the award did not include any amount for military referral
fees, there was nothing in the award to indicate that the arbitrator had
miscalculated.34' It was far more evident that Renaissance's military referral
fees claim had failed.343




335. See, e.g., Humphreys, 491 N.W.2d at 517.
336. See Humphreys, 491 N.W.2d at 517.
337. 426 S.E.2d 821 (S.C. CLt App. 1992).





343. Id at 823.
344. Id
345. Id
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In Mossman,346 the defendant asked the Delaware Court of Chancery to
modify or correct an arbitration award because it contained a miscalculation.3 47
The court explained that it could not review the arbitrator's award because there
was no "evident" miscalculation as required by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
5715(a)(1) (1975) (U.A.A. § 13(a)(1)).3 41 Utilizing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
5711 (1975) (U.A.A. § 9), the court directed the defendant to take the award back
to the arbitrator for correction announcing that "the arbitrator himself would not
be bound by [the] high [evident miscalculation] standard but could correct any
miscalculation he made, whether evident or not, so long as upon honest
consideration he concludes that he has made a miscalculation. 349
B. Section 13(a)(2): Matters Not Submitted
Another ground for review found in Section 13 is that the arbitrator awarded
on a matter not submitted. However, it is not a ground for review if the arbitrator
does not award on matters that were submitted. In Humphreys,3"0 the arbitration-
provision referred to several agreements the parties had entered into on the same
day.3 ' The arbitrator determined the contractual issues surrounding those
agreements and ignored the many tort and property claims that Humphreys and his
son submitted.3"2 The Supreme Court of Iowa said the arbitrator's failure to
consider certain evidence or to award on everything submitted is not a ground for
review under Section 13.
C. Ninety Day Time Limit
In addition to limiting the grounds for modification or correction of an
award, Section 13 imposes a ninety day time limit when applying for correction
or modification. The short time period for applying for a Section 13 review is
consistent with the policy of making arbitration an efficient, speedy process. 4
It assures that any challenge to the award will be promptly made and finality will
occur as quickly as possible.355 In United Technology and Resources, Inc. v.
Dar Al Islam,316 the arbitrator refused to award attorney's fees to United.
3 7
Because United failed to make a timely motion, it was barred from challenging the
346. No. 1202-K, 1993 WL 330062.
347. Id at *1.
348. Id at *2.
349. Id.
350. 491 N.W.2d 513.
351. Id. at 516.
352. Id. at 516-17.
353. Id
354. United Technology and Resources, Inc. v. Dar Al Islam, 846 P.2d 307, 310 (N.M. 1993).
355. Id.
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arbitrator's refusal.3"' The .court did not reach the issue of whether United's
challenge was appropriate under Section 13 because, by not applying in ninety
days, United waived its right to present any substantive defenses to the
confirmation of the award. 9 The court cited many cases discussing the strict
deadline on raising defenses to confirmation of an arbitration award.3"
If an award is not absolutely clear regarding a party's award, the party should
file a Section 9 application within twenty days for clarification or should file a
motion for confirmation within the Section 13 ninety-day limit. In Eatman 's, Inc.
v. Martin Engineering, Inc.,361 Eatman's and Martin had a contract dispute
which they submitted to arbitration.362 The arbitrator found in favor of Martin
and awarded a specific amount of damages plus attorney fees.363 The award did
not specify the amount of attorney fees.3" When Martin made a motion to
confirmn over one year later, Eatman's opposed it as an untimely motion for
modification because the trial court would have to set attorney fees. 365 The trial
court awarded attorney fees, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that setting the attorney fees was a modification that required application
within ninety days.3"
At least one court has recently held that the timely filing of a Section 9
application with the arbitrator tolls the time for requesting judicial review under
Sections 12 and 13 until the Section 9 application is decided by the arbitrator.367
Once the party receives delivery of the arbitrator's decision on a Section 9
application, the party has ninety days to request the court to vacate, modify or
correct the award.368 If the limitation period was not extended in this situation,
a party could lose the right of judicial review under Sections 12 and 13 whenever
an arbitrator failed to dispose of a Section 9 application within ninety days.369
Tolling the time period furthers the policy of giving one tribunal the chance to fix
its own mistakes before review by another tribunal.37°
358. Id at 308.
359. Id. at311.
360. Id. at311 n.3.
361. 428 S.E.2d 736 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993).




366. Id. at 736-37.
367. Hough v. Howington, 627 N.E.2d 36, 39-40 (II1. App. Ct. 1993) (citing Konicki v. Oak
Brook Racquet Club, 441 N.E.2d 1333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)).
368. Id. at 40.
369. Id
370. Id.
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XI. SECTION 14: JUDGMENT OR DECREE
Under U.A.A. Section 14, once a court confirms an arbitration award, it
should be entered as a judgment and enforced as such.3"' The court can award
costs for the confirmation hearing and everything thereafter.372 The court does
not have to make written findings of fact or conclusions of law. This was held
to be true even when a state statute required the trial court to make specific
findings concerning property to be divided in a divorce decree.37 3 Because the
parties agreed to arbitration, both the arbitrator and the court were excused from
making specific findings.3 74
A court's Section 14 power to award costs does not expressly include the
power to award attorney's fees. However, in Canon School District No. 50 v.
W.E.S. Constr. Co.,3"5 the trial court awarded attorney's fees incurred in the
confirmation proceedings pursuant to a different Arizona statute.376 The Arizona
Court of Appeals upheld the award saying that ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1514
(1982) (U.A.A. § 14) does not bar such awards.3 7
XII. SECTION 16: APPLICATIONS TO COURT TREATED AS MOTIONS
Section 16 directs that applications to the court to confirm, vacate, modify
or correct an award should be treated the same as motions.378 The court and the
parties should follow that court's rules for making and hearing motions, including
its rules on notice.379 Section 16 also says that the initial notice of the
application should be served like a summons is traditionally served in actions of
that court.380
In Hough v. Howington,311 Howington argued that Hough's application to
confirm the award was not served properly under Section 16 because the notice
of the application was served upon him by mail instead of by summons.382
Howington's argument failed because he had already made a general appearance
in the action; therefore, the court ruled that re-service was not necessary and mere
notice was sufficient.38 3  However, the court stated that if a party had not
371. UA.A. § 14.
372. Id
373. Hughes v. Hughes, 851 Pl.d 1007 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).
374. Id. at 1010.
375. 868 P.2d 1014 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
376. Id at 1024. The court relied on ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01(A) (1992).
377. Id at 1026.
378. U.A.A. § 16.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. 627 N.E.2d 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
382. Id. at 40.
383. Id. at 40-41.
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previously made a general appearance or the court had not otherwise obtained
jurisdiction, Section 16 would probably require service by summons.3
In Humphreys v. Joe Johnston Law Firm, P.C.,385 the parties agreed to
arbitrate their claims and an arbitration hearing was conducted.8 6  After the
award was made, Humphreys filed an application to modify, correct, or vacate
which was heard by the trial court and subsequently denied.387 On appeal,
Humphreys argued that his due process rights were violated because he was not
allowed full discovery prior. to the hearing on his application.388 The Supreme
Court of Iowa firmly rejected this argument.389 The court explained that due
process does not require full discovery to a motion hearing and Section 16 requires
a hearing on an application to modify, correct, or vacate to be treated exactly like
a motion hearing."9
Similarly, Section 16 does not allow a party to use a Section 12 or Section
13 hearing to assert new claims which were not part of the arbitration sought to
be enforced. The Massachusetts courts confirmed this in Baxter Health Care,
Corp. v. Harvard Apparatus, Inc.3 9' Harvard attempted to assert a counterclaim
at a hearing to decide Baxter's application for confirmation.392 The trial court
dismissed the counterclaim and the Massachusetts Court of Appeals affirmed,
saying that MASS. GEN. L ch. 251, § 15 (1988) (U.A.A. § 16) only authorizes the
making and hearing of motions at confirmation hearings.3 93
XIII. VENUE
Illinois addressed the question of venue in Mazur v. Quarters Designs,
Inc. 394  In Mazur, a contract between the parties required arbitration of any
disputes.395 After a dispute arose, an arbitration hearing held in Cook County
resulted in a $9,635 award against Mazur.396 Mazur filed a complaint in Will
County seeking to vacate, modify or correct the award, obtain a declaratory
judgment that the award not be enforced, and recover damages for the professional
negligence of Quarters.397 Quarters filed a motion to transfer to Cook County
pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 710, para, 5/17 (1992) (U.A.A. § 18) which
384. Id.
385. 491 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa* 1992).
386. Id. at 514.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 517.
389. Id. at 517-18.
390. Id.
391. 617 N.E.2d 1018 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
392. Id. at 1020.
393. Id. at 1021.
394. 619 N.E.2d 763 (I1. App. Ct. 1993).
395. Id.
396. Id
397. Id at 763-64.
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provides that Section 12 and Section 13 applications shall be filed in the court
where the initial application was made.3 98 The trial court denied the motion to
transfer and Quarters appealed.3  On appeal, Mazur argued that the general
venue provisions of Illinois should apply because he was seeking other relief in
addition to a vacation or modification of the award.4°  Under the general
provisions, Mazur could presumably choose his forum because there were multiple
venues available.40' The appellate court reversed and remanded with directions
to make the transfer to Cook County.4 2 The court stated that under a settled
rule of statutory construction, the specific venue provision of the Arbitration Act
must prevail over Illinois' general venue provisions, therefore, the case must be
heard in Cook County.403
In Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc. v. Slater,°4 the plaintiff filed an
application to confirm an arbitration award in Broward County.4  The
plaintiff's application relied on the Federal Arbitration Act ("F.A.A."). 41 The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss because Broward County was not the proper
venue under the F.A.A.. 407  The Circuit Court of Broward County dismissed,
finding that the application was not within its venue according to the F.A.A..408
The plaintiff then filed the application in Duval County, where the defendant
resided, pursuant to the Florida Arbitration Code.40 9 The Circuit Court of Duval
County also dismissed plaintiff's application stating that plaintiff should have
appealed Broward County's decision, rather than attempt to re-litigate the issue in
Duval County.410 The Florida Court of Appeals reversed, holding that refiling
in Duval County, an acceptable venue under the Florida Code, was proper.41
XIV. SECTION 19: APPEALS
Section 19 authorizes an appeal if the trial court: (1) denies an application
to compel arbitration; (2) grants an application to stay arbitration; (3) confirms or
denies confirmation of an award; (4) modifies an award; (5) vacates an award
without directing a rehearing; or (6) enters a judgment or decree.412
398. Id. at 764.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-101 et seq. (1992).
402. Id. at 765.
403. Id.
404. 615 So.2d 781 (Fla. Dst Ct. App. 1993).




409. FLA. STAT. ch. 682.19 (1990) (U.AA. § 18). Id.
410. Id at 783.
411. Id.
412. U.A.A. § 19.
1994]
33
Chapman et al.: Chapman: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Two of these authorized appeals are interlocutory: the appeal allowed from
orders refusing to compel arbitration; and the appeal allowed from orders staying
arbitration. Normally, interlocutory appeals are not allowed, but the U.A.A.
authorizes them because these two types of orders jeopardize the speed and cost-
savings of arbitration.41 3  In contrast, granting an application to compel
arbitration or refusing to stay arbitration does not affect the efficiency of
arbitration; therefore, these orders are not immediately appealable. 1 4
Does the U.A.A. authorize interlocutory appeals when it is questionable
whether the U.A.A. applies, such as when the arbitration agreement does not
comply with the requirements of U.A.A. Section 1? Two Texas courts have
recently considered this question and have come up with different answers. In
American Physicians Service Group, Inc. v. Port Lavaca Clinic Ass'n,4 5 the
issue was whether the Texas Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear an appeal
of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. 4" This type of interlocutory
appeal would normally be authorized by the Texas Arbitration Act,4 7 but the
appellee urged that this particular appeal was not authorized by the Act because
the arbitration clause in the contract at issue did not comply with the Act's
requirements. 3 Prior cases have held that the Act is only implicated when
these requirements were met, and if the Act is not implicated, no interlocutory
appeal is allowed.419 Port Lavaca expressly overruled those cases and allowed
the appeal.42" However, in conflict with Port Lavaca is Central Nat ' Insurance
Co. of Omaha v. Glover,42' which subsequently relied on the cases that Port
Lavaca had overruled.422
Other courts have considered the issue of when an appeal is authorized under
the other provisions of Section 19. In National Avenue Bldg. Co. v. Stewart,
423
a property owner sought to have an arbitration award in his favor confirmed by
the circuit court.424 The circuit court issued a memorandum declining to rule on
the application.4 2' The property owner appealed to the Missouri Court of
413. Des Moines Asphalt & Paving Co. v. Colcon Industries Corp., 500 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Iowa
1993).
414. See, e.g., Anderson County v. Architectural Techniques Corp., No. 03A01-9205CH184,
1993 WL 5921 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1993).
415. 843 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
416. Id. at 676.
417. Tax. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 238-2(A)(1) (West 1993).
418. Id at 677. The Act provided that the agreement to arbitrate must be highlighted in bold
print or stamped on the contract. Id.
419. Warranty Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Lara, 805 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991);
Capital Income Properties v. Waldman, 835 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
420. Lavaca, 843 S.W.2d at 677.
421. 856 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
422. Id. at 491-92.
423. 838 S.W.2d 514 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
424. Id at 515.
425.. Id
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Appeals which determined that the circuit court's memorandum was not an
appealable order.426
A Colorado court has determined that until there has been an arbitration
award on the merits and a court order confirming that award, a party cannot
appeal. More specifically, a party cannot appeal when an arbitrator directs
arbitration and the trial court confirms that decision because it would not be an
award on the merits.4" In Thomas v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,42 s the
arbitrator examined the Thomas' insurance policy with Farmers Insurance
Exchange to determine whether the parties were required to arbitrate Thomas'
claim.429 The arbitrator decided that, under the policy, the parties were required
to arbitrate the claim and ordered them to do so. 430 The defendant applied for
confirmation of the arbitrator's decision and the trial court confirmed it.43' The
defendant then appealed the trial court's confirmation.432  The appellate court
found the defendant's appeal premature, stating that the trial court's order
confirming the arbitrator's determination was not confirmation of an award on the
merits, thus it was interlocutory and not ripe for review.
433
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals recently stressed that the availability of
appellate review under Section 19 should not affect the impartiality of the
arbitration.434 The court was faced with an arbitration agreement which allowed
one party to select all the members of the arbitration panel and stated that "the fact
that some other judge or panel of judges will review the arbitrator's decision does







426. Id. at 516. However, in a subsequent opinion, the same court issued a writ of mandamus
to compel the circuit court to rule on the application for confirmation. Stewart v. McGuire, 838
S.W.2d 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
427. Thomas v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 857 P.2d 532 (Col. Ct. App. 1993).
428. Id.




433. Id at 534-35.
434. Ditto v. Re/Max Preferred Properties, 861 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
435. Id. at 1003.
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